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THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESSES OF THE SO-
CALLED ‘ARAB SPRING’ AND ITS ASSOCIATED 
POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS HAVE BEEN AND 
STILL REMAIN HIGHLY UNPREDICTABLE AND ALMOST 
IMPOSSIBLE TO SYSTEMATICALLY ACCOUNT FOR. 
THIS PAPER EXPLORES THE CONDITIONS THAT 
ALLOWED TUNISIA , THE BIRTH PLACE OF THE ‘ARAB 
SPRING,’ TO ACHIEVE SUCCESSFUL DEMOCRATISING 
OUTCOMES IN COMPARISON TO ITS NEIGHBOURS 
ACROSS THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
(MENA) REGION. THE PAPER WILL ALSO OFFER SOME 
ANALYSIS OF FUTURE SCENARIOS FOR SOCIO-
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS BASED ON CURRENT 
CONTEXT AND PROJECTED OUTLOOK. THIS PAPER 
ARGUES THAT ONE OF THE KEY INGREDIENTS THAT 
ALLOWED A RELATIVELY PEACEFUL ‘POLITICAL 
TRANSITION’ IN TUNISIA IS THE CONSTRUCTIVE 
APPROACH TO CONSENSUS POLITICS ADOPTED BY 
THE KEY POLITICAL ACTORS INCLUDING THE ISLAMIST 
PARTY ENNAHDA. CONSENSUS POLITICS CREATED 
WHAT CAN BE TERMED AN ‘AUTHENTIC TUNISIAN 
T h e D e m o c r at i c 
T r a n s i t i o n  i n P o s t -
r e v o l u t i o n  T u n i s i a : 
C o n d i t i o n s  f o r  S u c c e s s f u l  
C o n s o l i d at i o n  a n d  F u t u r e  
P r o s p e c t s
abstract
F e t h i  M a n s o u r i 
R i c c a r d o  A r m i l l e i
APPROACH,’ A COMBINATION OF POLITICAL PRAGMATISM, 
ACCEPTANCE OF POWER-SHARING AND A PROGRESSIVE 
SOCIAL POSITIONING IN KEY NATIONAL DEBATES. 
TUNISIA , POLITICAL ISLAM, DEMOCRATISATION, ‘POST-ARAB 
SPRING,’ ISLAMIST-SECULARIST COMPROMISE. 
  INTRODUCTION
Tunisia was the birthplace of the ‘Arab Spring’ and therefore became 
critically important as a case study of democratisation; not only for 
other Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries affected by 
the uprisings, but also as a testing ground to the assumption that Arab 
and Muslim societies are not able to democratise because of an inherent 
incompatibility between Islam and democratic progress.1 This latter 
assumption is important given Huntington’s2 influential argument that 
while most previously undemocratic regions of the world (particularly, but 
not exclusively, in Latin America and Eastern Europe) had experienced 
a ‘third wave of democratization’ in the late twentieth century, the Arab 
world seemed resistant to political reform, an anomaly that became known 
as the ‘Arab exceptionalism.’3 However, this assumption of a democratic 
deficit4 was fundamentally challenged early in 2011 by the repercussions 
of a young Tunisian man’s self-immolation in the central Tunisian town of 
Sidi Bouzid. His death sparked violent protests which quickly led to mass 
mobilizations and authoritarian breakdowns across the region.5 
Theorists of political system change, especially those working on ‘transition’ 
models were keen to understand the key causal factors behind the initial 
sudden collapse of authoritarian regimes which appeared to have been 
stable for decades6 and the extent to which these factors can engender 
or hinder the development of democratic governance and the rule of 
law in the post-revolution phase. With the exception of Tunisia, where 
a successful ‘political transition’ has thus far been achieved, democratic 
efforts in MENA countries have been faltering to differing degrees. The 
optimism that characterised the initial phase of the uprisings,7 quickly 
gave way to deep societal divisions along religious, tribal, ethnic and 
1  Cevik 2011.
2  Huntington 1991.
3  Brynen et al. 2012.
4  Mansouri 2016.
5  Wafa 2013.
6  Beck, Hüser 2012: 12.
7  Moaddel 2013.
keywords
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sectarian lines leading to outbursts of mass violence which compromised 
the delicate ‘transition’ processes.8 This fragmentation may be explained 
by the fact initial unity did ‘not appear to have originated from a shared 
understanding of the universal principle of democratic politics in order to 
transcend group differences.’9 
However, and from a methodological point of view, the ‘Arab Spring’ 
should not be analysed as a homogeneous revolutionary process given the 
heterogeneity of affected states and, therefore, predictions remain rather 
difficult to articulate with any degree of conceptual clarity or precision.10 
Whilst many agree that currently the ‘prospects for a more democratic 
Middle East seem worse than ever,’11 some commentators have suggested 
that the region was in the throes of an ‘Arab/Islamist/Economic Winter.’12 
Perhaps, these events should not be considered “springs or winter (…) but 
a historical process that most Western democracies have gone through 
– most of them took a long time – and we’re still in the early stages of 
it.”13 This paper adopts the latter approach in its analysis of the Tunisian 
case study. Despite facing security and economic challenges, this article 
shares the view of many scholars and observers14 that Tunisia has laid the 
constitutional foundations necessary to build a functional political system 
based on democracy and the rule of law. While analysing pre- and post-
revolutionary political achievements, this paper will examine the unique 
attributes of the Tunisian case study, paying particular attention to the 
relationship between Islamist and secularist parties. 
Since its independence from France in 1956, Tunisia went through 
a process of state-led secular social reform to become at once one of the 
most socially-progressive and politically-authoritarian countries in the 
Arab world.15 Until the 2011 revolution, in fact, political and economic 
life in Tunisia has been dominated by two long-standing autocratic 
rulers; Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. During this period, 
Tunisia’s social modernisation was characterized by a ‘continued repression 
towards Islam in the political – as well as the public – sectors’ together 
with human rights abuses.16 It is in 1989, with Ben Ali’s rise to presidency, 
that we find the backbone of Ennahda’s party. At that time thousands of 
imprisoned ‘The Movement of Islamic Tendency’ activists were released. 
The party renamed itself as Ennahda (Arabic for ‘renaissance’) and toned 
8  Behr, Siitonen 2013.
9  Moaddel 2013: 11.
10  Boose 2012.
11  Williamson, Abadeer 2014: para. 1.
12  Byman 2011; Totten 2012.
13  R. Khouri as quoted in: Schwartz 2014: para. 6.
14  Arieff, Humud 2015; Boose 2012; Ostry 2014.
15  Black 2010.
16  Louden 2015: 8.
down its reference to Islam with the hope of gaining formal recognition 
by Ben Ali’s government. Yet, relations between Islamists and the ruling 
regime continued to regress.17 It was only following the 2011 uprising, that 
more than 100 political parties (most prominently the Islamist Ennahda 
movement) were legalized, resulting in the emergence of a civic and 
political pluralism unprecedented in recent Tunisian history.
Widespread popular enthusiasm enabled Tunisia to quickly establish “an 
interim government tasked with organising elections to form a national 
constituent assembly that would draft a new constitution.”18 But this task 
has been repeatedly delayed due to a lack of agreement over certain aspects 
of the new constitution’s content. Since the early stages of the uprising, 
a gulf of mistrust had characterized the relationship between Islamist 
and secularist political factions, with each side seeking “to manipulate 
the rules of politics to its advantage.”19 The level of mutual suspicions was 
particularly high in 2013 especially following a number of violent attacks 
perpetrated by the Salafist extremist group Ansar al-Shari`a (Supporters 
of Islamic Law), an illegal terrorist organization. A year earlier, a violent 
attack on the US embassy had pushed the Ennahda-led government to 
take a first clear stance against jihadi Salafists. Until then, in fact, Ennahda 
had supported the inclusion of Salafist parties into the political landscape 
believing that the new Tunisia should be inclusive of all ideologies, including 
conservative religious ones. But growing popular opposition and ensuing 
political impasses, pushed Ennahda to step down peacefully in favour of a 
caretaker technocrat government that would oversee the presidential and 
parliamentary elections.20 These elections were eventually held late in 2014 
with newly formed secular centrist Nidaa Tunis party winning both. 
17  Louden 2015.
18  Watanabe 2013: 1.
19  Arieff, Humud 2015: 1.
20  Louden 2015. 
TUNISIA HAS LAID THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS NECESSARY TO BUILD 
A FUNCTIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM BASED ON 
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW
“
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Since March 2015, three new incidents of Islamist extremism (the Bardo 
and Sousse attacks21 first followed by the bus explosion killing presidential 
guards),22 led President Essebsi to declare a ‘state of emergency’ throughout 
the country. Despite these tragic events and serious economic discontent, 
neither the transitional process towards democracy, nor the relationship 
between Islamist and secularist parties in the governing coalition were 
affected. Indeed, as of August 2016 the incoming national unity government 
will most likely exhibit similar political arrangements as the initial post 
2015 elections governing coalition. This paper argues a crucial reason for 
a relatively successful ‘political transition’ has been the role played by the 
Islamist Party, Ennahda, which mastered the art of ‘consensus politics’ 
across political and ideological divides. This approach, which ultimately 
led to a local adaptation of ‘democratic transition,’ involved three main 
features: (1) a pragmatic approach to everyday deliberative politics; 
(2) a strategic orientation towards power-sharing arrangements involving 
secular parties; and (3) an acceptance of progressive social agendas in key 
national debates in particular those relating to women’s rights. The fact 
that recently Ennahda declared that it will separate the political from the 
religious (i.e. preaching) signals a reinforcement of the ‘Tunisification’ 
process of Ennahda as it continues to distance itself from the regional 
Muslim Brotherhood movement.23 
The next section will situate the Tunisian political process within broader 
debates on ‘democratic transition’ highlighting the contextual specificities 
that complicate the task of making accurate ‘predictions’ regarding 
democratic ‘consolidation.’ 
  THE CHALLENGE OF PREDICTING DEMOCRATIC 
  ‘CONSOLIDATION’ IN THE MENA REGION
Theories of ‘transition’ elaborated in the 1970s postulated ‘the possibility 
of linear transitions from authoritarianism to liberal democracy.’24 This 
approach was applied to the ‘transition’ experience of many Eastern 
European countries, where protests brought communism down leading 
towards free market and political pluralism.25 Interestingly, the ‘Arab 
21  Islamic State (IS) was said to be behind both deadly attacks targeting mainly foreign 
tourists with tourism representing Tunisia’s largest source of foreign currency. It is worth 
noting that Tunisia has contributed the largest number of foreign fighters to IS in Syria and 
Iraq. In this context, conflict-racked Libya, together with the return of foreign fighters that 
have joined radical groups fighting in Iraq and Syria, have preoccupied Tunisian politics 
despite democratic advances (El-Ghobashy, Addala 2015).
22  Freeman, Squires 2015; Stephen 2015.
23  Mellor, Rinnawi 2016.
24  Guazzone, Pioppi 2009: 2.
25  Rahmetov 2012: 2.
Spring’ has often been likened to the process of democratization in post-
Communist, Eastern European regimes.26 Although as Vallianatos27 argues 
‘the former Communist bloc carries a significant experience of political 
transformation which could be of relevance to the Arab states,’ the exact 
democratic process might not be replicable elsewhere. Beck & Hüser28 
provide three possible explanations (political, historical and economic), 
which would impede a comparison between the 1989 and 2011 waves of 
revolutions. 
Firstly, unlike the Eastern European countries, Arab countries have lower 
‘external’ incentives for democratization. For example, Arab countries 
do not have the same type of support and guidance provided by the 
EU.29 Indeed, there is no regional equivalent to the EU as local efforts to 
create any kind of ‘pan-Arab’ or even ‘pan-Maghreb’ transnational unity 
have repeatedly failed over the last three decades.30 The Arab League has 
been and remains too divided and weak to play such a constructive role. 
Interestingly, the most successful ‘transitions,’ particularly among the 
Eastern European countries, were greatly facilitated by assistance from the 
EU.31
The second critical factor to consider can be found in the differing historical 
trajectories of Eastern European countries and the Arab world: 
It should be noted that the region’s nationalist regimes (with some 
socialist paint), established in the 1950s, were an indigenous reaction 
to Western imperialism and colonialism, while socialism in Eastern 
Europe was externally imposed by the Soviet Union. After the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, Eastern European states were able to return to 
their economic and political heritage, which they shared with Western 
Europe, but the Arab world faces the challenge of having to redefine 
itself politically and economically.32
And thirdly, there are economic factors which can affect the development 
26  Beck, Hüser 2012; Ishay 2013.
27  Vallianatos 2013: 7.
28  Beck, Hüser 2012.
29  However, there have been numerous attempts by the EU to encourage good governance 
in some MENA countries. This is the case for Morocco - which has an ‘advanced status’ 
in European Neighbourhood Policy’s Southern Dimension and Tunisia with ‘privileged 
partnership’ within the same policy. Both countries are also in different phases of the Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement – the agreement which is a leading tool for 
encouraging reforms, including democratic ones (Rey 2016).
30  Sawani 2012.
31  Ishay 2013.
32  Beck, Hüser 2012: 19-20.
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and consolidation of democratic institutions. At the end of the Cold War, 
economic actors attracted by the prospect of substantial profits, invested 
in Eastern European countries, which were concurrently encouraged to 
advance certain reform processes, thus giving investors confidence. In 
comparison the political and social instability in post-revolution ‘Arab 
Spring’ countries deterred investors. 
As these three factors demonstrate, ‘democratic transition’ is not an 
inevitable outcome. Indeed and in addition to the political, historical and 
economic challenges ‘if the post-revolutionary political platform is not 
compatible in substance with human rights norms’ this creates yet another 
structural hurdle.33 Although a number of attitudinal studies pertaining 
to democracy in Arab and non-Arab Muslim states show democracy is 
gaining support,34 the post-revolutionary phase in ‘Arab Spring’ countries 
has also been characterized by the emergence of anti-revolutionary and 
anti-democratic forces, mainly conservative and radical Islamist groups, 
which has the potential to jeopardize the prospects for ‘democratic 
consolidation.’35 
Recent polls (May 2016) in relation to Tunisian voters’ attitudes towards 
political parties reveal some worrying trends. Indeed, 72% of Tunisians 
have a negative perception of political parties; 67% state that political 
parties are not that close to them in terms of understanding their needs; 
and only 35% think that political parties make decisions in the best interest 
of citizens.36 Whilst democracy is becoming more ubiquitous in the minds 
of Arab people in general,37 no longer the preserve of intellectuals and 
politicians, the Arab world as a whole is still “charting a revolutionary 
path through an era of unfamiliar democratization, and there is no way to 
predict the outcome until it is over.”38 A ‘Western-style democracy’ cannot 
simply be super-imposed on the Middle East as there are specific nuances 
33  Ishay 2013: 7.
34  Ghosh 2013; Moaddel 2013; Sawani 2014.
35   Mansouri 2016.
36  Sigma Conseil 2016.
37  According to the 2015 Arab Opinion Index (AOI) “79% of Arabs believe that democracy 
is the most appropriate system of government for their home countries.” This study was based 
on 18,311 face-to-face interviews conducted in 12 different Arab countries including Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Egypt, Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait (Arab Center Washington DC 2016).
38  Boose 2012: 310.
‘PAN-ARAB’ OR EVEN ‘PAN-MAGHREB’ 
TRANSNATIONAL UNITY HAVE REPEATEDLY 
FAILED OVER THE LAST THREE DECADES“ of state-society relations that “need to be taken into consideration, because various strings of democratic ideas, values and practices are embedded in such relations.”39 An “Arabian version of democracy,” Ghosh argues, contains “ideas on 
justice, authority, and political obligation – the way authority [has] been able 
to command loyalty from the subject-population since ancient times.”40 It 
is thus important to acknowledge that due to contextual specificities as well 
as other cultural and historical differences, Western democratic systems 
cannot always be transposed onto other societies, where democratic 
governance can at times take a different form. Nor is this always desirable.
In this context, the specific role of religious ideologies in politics cannot 
be curtailed or avoided altogether, as many Western countries and their 
Middle Eastern allies have openly tried to do.41 Yet, the role of religion 
in politics poses conceptual challenges for those who seek to analyse and 
understand the nature of ‘democratic transition’ in non-Western societies. 
  FROM ‘INDEPENDENCE’ AND NATION-BUILDING 
  TO ‘AUTHORITARIAN’ RULE 
The 2010 uprising marked an epochal shift in Tunisian history, as the 
North African state was characterized by a lack of deep-rooted procedural 
and institutional ‘democratic culture.’42 This section provides an historical 
overview of the development of an outright authoritarian agenda since 
liberation from French colonial rule. It illustrates the main characteristics 
of Bourguiba’s and Ben Ali’s regimes: a centrally controlled economic and 
political system; imprisonment of human rights activists; relegation of 
religious idioms to a secondary status. As a consequence, the initial euphoria 
regarding the prospects for political reform were also accompanied by fears 
that the process of developing resilient democratic institutions would fail 
in the longer term.
In the aftermath of Tunisia’s independence, a set of laws (also known as 
Code of Personal Status or CPS) were introduced allowing “women to 
avoid polygamy, repudiation, child marriages (with a minimum marriage 
age and consent of both spouses)” and permitting them to initiate divorce 
proceedings.43 A year later women gained suffrage, and in 1959 were able to 
run for public office. Women’s equality was also enshrined in the Tunisian 
Constitution and a number of supplementary legal texts. The improvement 
39  Ghosh 2013: 17-18.
40  Ghosh 2013: 18.
41  Louden 2015.
42  Dennison et al. 2011.
43  Retta 2013: 36.
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of women’s legal status and social conditions, and a significant investment 
in national education, triggered a demographic transformation which 
changed the post-independence social landscape. As a result, “today 
women students constitute over half the university student body and 
women actively participate throughout society and politics.”44 It is the social 
emancipation of Tunisian women which ensured their prominent role 
during the uprising45 and cementing the ensuing post-revolution prospects 
for developing and sustaining democracy in comparison to other MENA 
countries.46
However, despite this social and educational reform, pre-revolution 
Tunisia remained lacking in political freedoms and human rights 
protections. Indeed, political opposition remained weak in Tunisia as 
the centralised government maintained near complete control over the 
political landscape47 and the institutions that sustained it. Civil society was 
forced to adhere to the state’s priorities in the name of fighting colonialist 
legacies, achieving national sovereignty, establishing a modern national 
state and advancing broader social and economic reforms.48 During his 
presidency Bourguiba instituted what I. W. Zartman49 termed ‘position 
politics/patronage’ in which “important posts [were given] to powerful 
individuals who could use their positions to service their own clienteles.” 
In this context, even when forced underground, civil society provided few 
openings for external manipulation, creating an indirect connection with 
the elite in power and some room for political manoeuvre. The main aim of 
Bourguiba’s politics was the maintenance of social cohesiveness and unity 
within an authoritarian framework, with religious idioms relegated to 
a secondary status.50 
Ben Ali replaced Bourguiba in 1987 in a bloodless coup d’état and his 
presidency was an example of what R. W. Bulliet51 terms ‘Neo-Mamluk 
rule,’ referring “to personalist dictatorships that were built by autocrats 
originating from the military/security services.”52 Despite the introduction 
of a number of what appeared to be at the time as progressive measures, 
44  Deane 2013: 14.
45  Retta 2013.
46  Boose 2012.
47  Naciri 2009: 16.
48  Chomiak, Entelis 2013.
49  As quoted in: Alexander 2013: 34.
50  Sadiki 2002.
51  As quoted in: Rahmetov 2012: 9.
52  A more recent study conducted that provides transition information for the 280 
autocratic regimes (in 110 countries with more than a million population) in existence from 
1946 to 2010, Tunisia was coded as ‘dominant-party’ rather than ‘personalist’ (Geddes et al. 
2014). This category is defined as a regime where control over policy, leadership selection, and 
the security apparatus is in the hands of one party.
political participation, freedom of expression and religious activism 
remained harshly repressed.53
Indeed, when Ben Ali succeeded Bourguiba, a “benign form of 
authoritarian rule” was replaced by a “form of manipulative democracy,” 
with democratic rhetoric and institutions concealing a stronger version 
of authoritarianism.54 Compared to his predecessor, Ben Ali was less 
willing to use ‘position politics/patronage;’ instead he tried to “break the 
tie between elite and popular politics that was so vital in the 1970s and 
1980s” ensuring that civil society would remain “unavailable as a political 
weapon.”55 Motivated by a deep fear of a region-wide Islamist threat, which 
was heightened by the 1992 Algerian civil war,56 Ben Ali’s reign oversaw the 
imposition of authoritarian mechanisms to regulate civil society and curb 
its capacity for action. After the first two promising years, with Ben Ali 
allowing multi-party elections, granting amnesty to hundreds of political 
prisoners and adopting a liberal press code among the other things, his 
regime became a ‘police state’ for the next two decades repressing political 
opponents and any semblance of active civil society.57 And no group felt 
this repression more severely than Islamist activists.
In fact, the Islamist political party, Ennahda, became the second most 
important force in Tunisian politics, leading the Ben Ali regime to increase 
state coercive forces and to ‘emasculate’ the Islamist movement.58 Despite 
such repressive measures, civil society as a whole was able to survive thanks 
in particular to a well-established labour union tradition. While pushing 
the government to improve the conditions of workers in the country, the 
trade union movement contributed to creating an environment for social 
dialogue. Founded in 1924, the first labour union in the Arab world,59 it 
played a strong role not only before, but also during the independence 
struggle, as well as in the post-independence nation-building process.60 
Subsequently, the number of civil society organizations increased from 
nearly 2,000 in 1988 to over 9,000 in 200961 and to a record 18,000 in 
2016.62 Despite their unorganized nature, the popular pressure exerted by 
these associations was fundamental in toppling the Ben Ali regime and 
later in ensuring a successful ‘transitional phase.’63 The Islamists, as part of 
53  Arieff, Humud 2015.
54  Chomiak, Entelis 2013: 76.
55  Alexander 2013: 38.
56  Schulhofer-Wohl 2007.
57  King 2014.
58  King 2014.
59  International Labour Organization 2014.
60  Mansouri 2016.
61  C. M. Henry 2011 as quoted in: Mansouri 2016.
62  Barhoumi 2016.
63  Deane 2013.
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a broader socio-political landscape, were influenced and pushed towards 
‘consensus politics’ by an active and broadly secular civil society and, 
consequently played a constructive role in the post-revolution transitional 
democratic stage. 
  DEMOCRATIC ‘ TRANSITION’ AND THE  
  CHALLENGES OF POST-REVOLUTION  
  ‘CONSOLIDATION’
After a period of political uncertainty, the Tunisian ‘transition’ has been re-
cently characterised as an “exceptional success story” by Freedom House.64 
This is notable in comparison to other Arab countries affected by the ‘Arab 
Spring.’ Indeed, across the region the score card is not all that positive: 
there is ‘an army-backed authoritarian regime in Egypt, chaos and a disin-
tegrating social and political fabric in Libya, an endless civil war in Syria, 
and political instability in Yemen.’65 The success achieved in what is now 
being dubbed the ‘Tunisian Spring’ looks even more significant when de-
mocracy at the international level faced numerous challenges over the 
last few decades due to a decline of global political rights and civil liber-
ties.66 Five years ago, just prior to the uprising, Tunisia was rated as a ‘Not 
Free’ country and categorised as one of the most repressive regimes in the 
world.67 While the rest of the MENA region continues to be plagued by in-
stability, violence and civil wars, 2015 will be regarded as an historical year 
for the North African state, becoming the first Arab country to achieve 
a ‘Free’ country status on the Freedom House scale.68
The presence of local NGOs, as well as international observers, oversee-
ing the electoral processes contributed to the success and legitimacy of the 
elections. Annemie Neyts-Utterbroeck, of the observer mission of the EU, 
described the voting in Tunisia as “more than satisfactory.”69 The parliamen-
tary elections were touted as the end of the ‘transitional’ period, signalling 
an important step towards the normalization of the new political system.70 
Yet, as Reidy71 has recently argued; “Tunisia’s shining example is still a work 
in progress. Scratching at the surface of the ‘democratic transition’ reveals 
that the old system inherited from the era of dictatorship is still largely in-
tact.” Nidaa Tounes brings together a wide variety of ideological currents, 
64  Freedom House 2015b.
65  Ben Mcharek 2015: para. 2.
66  Freedom House 2015b.
67  Freedom House 2015b.
68  Freedom House 2015b: 1.
69  The Tunis Times 2014: para. 4.
70  Yaşar 2014.
71  Reidy 2015.
from human rights advocates to members of the labour union, as well as 
leftists and some independents. Among the Party are also former members 
of Ben Ali’s Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) party who have not 
been implicated in corruption, but remain some of “the numerically and 
economically most powerful members of Nidaa Tounes.”72 The presence of 
those with knowledge and experience of how to run a government might 
explain at least partially Tunisia’s success story.
In any case, as Reidy suggests, Tunisia’s ‘transition’ is still an ongoing 
process whose long-term sustainability will depend on the newly-elected 
government’s ability to address a number of urgent issues (corruption, 
economic stagnation and terrorism), which have the capacity to 
compromise internal stability and revive political polarization.73 According 
to the 2015 annual report on political rights and civil liberties issued by 
Freedom House,74 corruption in Tunisia has been increasing in the last 
three years and ‘a strong legal framework and systematic practices aimed at 
curbing corruption have yet to take shape.’ Some politicians and members 
of the security forces are perceived to be among the most corrupt groups. 
The inconsistent application of the rule of law and ongoing regulatory 
inefficiency have weakened Tunisia’s fragile economic framework, which 
remains stagnant with a high level of unemployment (17.5%). According 
to the ‘2015 Index of Economic Freedom,’75 the persistence of a system 
characterized by privileges and cronyism is at the core of the country’s 
deep-rooted socioeconomic deficiency.
In a poll of 8,045 young people in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen carried 
out by the Al Jazeera Center for Studies (AJCS)76 rampant corruption and 
the deterioration of national economies were the most cited causes of the 
uprisings across the region, including Tunisia, where the fate of its new 
government is linked to its success in meeting Tunisians’ high expectations 
for rapid economic and democratic development. What has clearly emerged 
from the analysis of a number of opinion polls conducted since the uprising 
is the economic performance of the country can directly affect Tunisians’ 
72  Wolf 2014: 15.
73  Reidy 2015.
74  Freedom House 2015a: Section C.
75  Heritage Foundation 2015.
76  AJCS 2013.
THE ‘ TUNISIAN SPRING’ LOOKS EVEN MORE 
SIGNIFICANT WHEN DEMOCRACY AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL FACED NUMEROUS 
CHALLENGES OVER THE LAST FEW DECADES
“
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faith in the democratic system and their degree of political engagement 
and social connectedness.77
More worryingly perhaps, is the significant challenge to ‘democratic 
consolidation’ that the spread of terrorist threats across North Africa 
poses. The presence of radical groups in and around Tunisia is growing and 
benefits from the political instability in neighbouring Libya.78 The ‘Arab 
Spring’ itself, as Mullin and Rouabah79 argue, was not merely a ‘liberal 
revolution’ but contained within it a conglomerate of radical pushes. 
Before the recent attack on the Bardo Museum and the Sousse beach resort, 
extremism and political violence had reached their climax in 2013 with the 
assassination of two members of the leftist Popular Front coalition. Today, 
despite the implementation of counter-terrorism strategies, religiously-
motivated violence, chiefly committed by jihadi Salafist groups, remains 
a challenge80 to the long-term viability of the only functional democracy 
across the region. 
  
  ‘CONSENSUS POLITICS’ AS A KEY FOUNDATION 
  FOR ‘DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION’ 
Given the economic and security challenges, the two dominant political 
forces of the post-2014 elections (Islamist Ennahda and secular centrist 
Nidaa) needed to engage in a new type of ‘real politics,’ thus avoiding the 
ideological polarization which characterized much of Tunisian political 
history.81 This strategic partnership was needed in order to overcome 
a crisis that jeopardised the many political achievements of the revolution. 
In this context, the lack of a clear majority for any party in parliament after 
the 2014 elections posed a real risk of fragmentation and volatility in an 
already fragile arrangement.82 The presidential elections re-emphasized the 
existence of ideological divisions, not just between Islamists and the more 
secular Nidaa Tounes or the leftist Popular Front groups, but also between 
the wealthier capital and coastal constituencies and the less developed 
interior towns.83 The outcome of these elections, therefore, produced 
a new Tunisia characterized by a bipolar constellation that attracted almost 
70% of the popular vote in the parliamentary elections: the centrist secular 
Nidaa Tounes on the one hand, and the moderate Islamist Ennahda on the 
other, as well as a number of smaller parties fighting to win the hearts and 
77  International Republican Institute 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; Pew Research Center 2014; Sigma 
Conseil 2013 as quoted in: Yaros 2013; Sigma Conseil 2014, 2016.
78  Bohlander 2013.
79  Mullin, Rouabah 2014.
80  Wolf 2014: 17.
81  Hamid 2014.
82  Redissi, Ben Amar 2015: 2.
83  The New York Times 2014.
minds of Tunisian voters. 
And yet despite a deep ideological divide, as well as the difficult economic 
and security situation, the new Tunisian political elite have overall 
“displayed unparalleled political maturity, with the challenge of continuing 
the process of political compromise and settlement.”84 In a crucial stage 
of the ‘democratic consolidation,’ the constant dialogue between leaders 
of opposing parties is paving the way of stability for many years to come. 
For instance, back in 2013 and during a time of real crisis following the 
political assassinations of prominent opposition figures, and as Wolf put 
it, “the Islamist-led government did not cling to power by all means,”85 a 
decision that proved critical in the Tunisian ‘democratic consolidation’ 
phase. Similarly, outgoing president Marzouki’s decision not to challenge 
the results of the country’s presidential election is a further sign of détente 
and political acumen.86 This ‘pragmatism and moderation’ in the case of 
Tunisia can nurture hope in a wretched region.87
The country is now governed (and will continue to be) through a broad 
political coalition and in accordance with international standards. Surely, 
as Mastic observed, Ennahda’s strategic choice of ‘consensus politics’ in 
Tunisia does not appear congruous with other events in North Africa.88 
In Egypt, for instance, a groundswell of protest ultimately led to President 
Muhammad Morsi’s ousting and “the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
Islamist candidates fared poorly in Libya’s House of Representatives 
elections.”89 The faltering Egyptian scenario, in particular, emphasizes the 
extent of the successful political trajectory of Tunisia. As Solomon put it:
 
Unlike former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Ennahda’s leader, Rached Ghannouchi, an Islamist 
scholar who spent decades in exile in Britain, acted pragmatically 
when faced with overwhelming opposition. Instead of trying to 
force his party’s Islamist vision on much of the population that is 
less religious, Ghannouchi did not overstay his welcome, deciding to 
continue playing the political game, instead of seizing power in ways 
reminiscent of Morsi.90
In this context, the successful national dialogue in Tunisia, which led to 
84  Haffiz 2015: 7.
85  Wolf 2014: 3.
86  Anadolu Agency 2014.
87  Mullin, Rouabah 2014.
88  Mastic 2014.
89  Mastic 2014: para. 1.
90  Solomon 2014: para. 2-3.
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an inclusive road map towards political stability, is a reminder that “just as 
Islamists could not establish a democracy by excluding others, the others 
cannot do so by excluding Islamists.”91 The civil society quartet was duly 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2015, a recognition of the critical role 
played in ensuring peaceful and democratic transformations were achieved 
in Tunisia.
Ideological divisions are a common aspect of political liberalism as 
democratic politics is based on “a pluralism of incompatible ideological 
doctrines that divide otherwise free and equal citizens by multiple, 
but often overlapping, class, ideological, religious, geographic or other 
cleavages.”92 Secularist and Islamists, as the Tunisian example shows, are 
not inherently incompatible. Indeed, “the two aren’t mutually exclusive and 
such dichotomy is reductionist and essentialist. [Besides], Islamists are not 
monolithic and most of them are committed to democratic principles.”93
The Tunisian case is a reminder that political processes are more complex 
in the Arab world than elsewhere, particularly because of deep vertical 
divisions along sectarian and tribal lines.94 As Hale suggests, “a ‘trajectory’ 
toward or away from ideal-type endpoints like democracy or autocracy”95 
cannot be precisely predicted. Political change can be cyclic, oscillating 
between democracy and dictatorship, rather than purely progressive or 
regressive.96 Scholars, such as Carothers, discard the ‘transition paradigm’ 
tout court, arguing that the indistinct space “between full-fledged 
democracy and outright dictatorship is actually the most common political 
condition today of countries in the developing world and the post-
communist world.”97 
The concept of ‘democratic consolidation’ can also be problematic as it 
refers to a process containing a multiplicity of meanings, context-dependent 
and perspective-dependent, which can produce a plurality of typologies98 
reflecting different degrees of regime ‘consolidation:’ semi-democracy, 
formal democracy, electoral democracy, façade democracy or pseudo-
democracy to name a few.99 The risk of using such categories, though, 
is to describe countries as suspended somewhere on a ‘democratization 
sequence.’100 Yet, as Schedler suggests, making predictive inferences, might 
91  Khan 2014: 84.
92  J. Rawls 2005 as quoted in: Pappas 2014: 3.
93  Daadaoui 2014: para. 2.
94  Z. Majed as quoted in: Mcafee 2011.
95  Hale 2005: 134.
96  Mansouri 2016.
97  Carothers 2002: 18.
98  For example, Schedler 2001: 66-67.
99  G. O’Donnell 1996a, 1996b, as quoted in: Schedler 2001.
100  Carothers 2002.
allow us to assess if a democracy is secure from a possible ‘breakdown.’101 
What emerges from such argument is that ‘democratic consolidation’ 
implies not just observation, but also prospective reasoning. 
The assessment and discussion of the consolidation process may begin by 
formulating open-ended examinations of the political situation as a whole102 
and by considering if the country has been developing what Morlino calls 
the ‘qualities’ of a ‘good’ democracy.103 Democracy as some argue can be 
defined as “a stable institutional structure that realizes the liberty and 
equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its 
institutions and mechanisms.”104 Quality can then be measured in terms 
of ‘result’ (citizens are satisfied), ‘content’ (citizens enjoy moderate level of 
liberty and equality) or ‘procedure’ (citizens can check and evaluate if the 
government operates according to the rule of law). Rothstein corroborates 
this view by stressing the importance of ‘performance’ or ‘output’ measures 
(such as the control of corruption or government effectiveness) in 
explaining political legitimacy.105
The prevailing view among scholars is that ‘democratic transitions’ can 
help to understand the type of democracy that will emerge and whether 
or not it is likely to ‘consolidate.’106 For instance, while ‘smooth’ transitions 
generally associate with lower risks of war and higher levels of democracy 
during the post-transitional phase, ‘rocky’ (or violent) transitions associate 
with increases in war and are more likely to revert to authoritarian rule.107 
In the case of Tunisia, the critical factors that prevented political break-
down and post-revolutionary chaos were the proactive role of civil society; 
the ‘consensus politics’ that produced the new constitution, the successive 
credible political elections held since the overthrow of the Ben Ali 
dictatorship, together with the commitment of its major political parties to 
cooperation and compromise. The combination of these events represents 
a cornerstone of Tunisia’s ‘democratic transition,’ which equipped the 
country with the structural foundation for sustainable political reform. 
It may still be too early to say if the state will ‘consolidate’ its democratic 
gains in the long term, given the current challenges on the economic and 
security fronts.108 Yet, the very introduction of deliberative democracy 
and pluralist politics, with opposing forces primarily concerned with 
transitioning the state towards consolidating a working, stable democracy, 
101  Schedler 2001. 
102  Carothers 2002.
103  Morlino 2009.
104  Morlino 2009: 4.
105  Rothstein 2014.
106  Stradiotto, Guo 2010.
107  Ward, Gleditsch 1998, as quoted in: Stradiotto, Guo 2010.
108  Mansouri 2015; Cheibub 2014.
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signals that ‘democratic transition’ has been achieved in Tunisia.109 The 
institutionalization of democratic gains will ensure a stronger state 
and more robust political institutions.110 This will be especially the case 
if the major political partners in the new coalition government are able 
to manage their own internal fallouts democratically and peacefully.111 
Drawing upon Schedler’s112 work on ‘democratic consolidation,’ we see this 
process as connected to the concept’s original concern with democratic 
survival. By avoiding democratic breakdown (authoritarian regression) 
and democratic erosion (gradual weakening of democracy), we argue 
that Tunisia is achieving a relatively successful ‘consolidated democracy’ 
that many observers expect to last well into the foreseeable future. Such 
a prognostic for Tunisia, which is based on robust determinants of 
democracy (chiefly primary schooling), would support positive predictions. 
Indeed, using a long-time frame (1870–2000 period), Murtin & Wacziarg 
found strong empirical support for Lipset’s modernization hypothesis, 
according to which improvements in economic standards would ultimately 
lead to democratization.113 By sustaining this theory Murtin & Wacziarg 
argue that is actually the level of primary schooling, and to a lesser extent 
income levels, to have a substantial impact on (broadly defined) democracy 
standards. Support to Lipset’s theory came also from Wucherpfennig & 
Deutsch. According to them, democracy is not a random process, but 
rather the results of certain “socio-economic conditions which create 
and maintain an environment for stable and enduring democracies.”114 
‘Democratic transition’ is thus not only a procedural matter at the level of 
constitutions and elections, but also pertains to the delivery of services in 
particular quality public schooling. 
Two recent studies show that Tunisia’s progress is in line with Murtin & 
Wacziarg’s findings. According to the first study, conducted by Education 
Policy and Data Center (EPDC),115 the progress made by Tunisia towards 
universal primary education – which represents a key UN Sustainable 
Development Goal – suggests that “the country has achieved near universal 
primary education.” The second study, a report issued by the World Bank in 
109  Stradiotto, Guo 2010.
110  Carbone, Memoli 2015.
111  Mansouri 2015.
112  Schedler 1998.
113  Murtin, Wacziarg 2014:178.
114  Wucherpfennig, Deutsch 2009.
115  EPDC 2014:2.
THE COUNTRY HAS ACHIEVED NEAR 
UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION“
2015, also confirms that GDP per capita has been constantly growing in the 
last two decades, despite a slight decline in the last few years in conjunction 
with socio-political upheaval following the 2011 revolution. Although 
security and economic challenges persist, Tunisia appears “to be entering 
a steady recovery from a period of heightened volatility and uncertainty.”116
  
  CONCLUSION 
Tunisia was the first ‘Arab Spring’ country to embark on a transformative 
process away from authoritarian structures and towards democratic 
governance and accountable institutions. Tunisia’s political vicissitudes 
are assuming a strategic, even symbolic importance, not only for the 
Arab world in general, but also for theorists of democratic ‘transition’ 
and ‘consolidation.’ Yet as we explore the prospects of longer-term 
consolidation, the twin challenges of economic/unemployment instability, 
and the threat of radical Jihadist groups will test the capacity of the new 
democratically-elected governments to deliver tangible progress to 
internal constituencies and external stakeholders alike. A key condition, 
therefore, for sustained success is for Tunisia to be supported regionally 
and internationally in overcoming these challenges as well as in managing 
internal ideological polarization whilst continuing to operate within 
a democratic institutional framework.117 Sustaining Tunisia’s democratic 
gains, though, will send a significant signal to anti-democratic forces 
that thrive amid chaos and instability across the region. Post-revolution 
success in ensuring internal security, economic stability and political 
legitimacy means “Tunisia has been, and remains, the only credible 
story”118 in a region beset by failing states and rising terrorist activities. 
Tunisia’s success reflects an ‘authentic Tunisian approach’ that has been 
dubbed ‘the Tunisian exception,’ one that saw pragmatic ‘consensus politics’ 
trump narrow ideological doctrines in pursuit of genuine political reform. 
Our conceptualization is thus in line with Heffernan’s work, who defines such 
consensus not as an agreement or a settlement but as a political framework 
which “constrains the autonomy of governing elites, encouraging them 
to conform to an established policy agenda that defines the ‘mainstream’ 
wherein ‘the possible is the art of politics.’”119 In this context, the government 
becomes the instrument which should accomplish what needs to be 
done, even if this cuts across ideological doctrines. ‘Consensus politics’ 
is, therefore, best defined as a ‘constrained space’ within which politics is 
conducted and political actors may still differ but with the common goal 
116  World Bank 2015:3.
117  Cheibub 2014.
118  Mansouri 2015: para. 13.
119  Heffernan 2002: 742. 
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of producing change while ensuring overall stability. A democratic Tunisia 
that is also stable and prosperous will offer a platform, if not a ‘model,’ for 
other MENA countries especially those currently struggling with complex 
and at times chaotic transitions.
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